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Abstract1 
 
This paper studies the relations between the European Union (EU) and China in 
order to answer the question whether their relationship is moving “from engagement 
to marriage.” It is divided into three parts: in the first part, the review of bilateral EU-
China relations from 1975 until today shows that the partnership has been noticeably 
institutionalized both economically and politically thanks to the efforts of both sides. 
The second part analyses the common ground and problems between the two 
partners by examining their cooperation at the international level and the major 
bilateral issues of concern. In spite of differences in economic, social and political 
developments, the two sides tend to emphasize their shared interests in economic 
and trade relations as well as in maintaining international peace and security. The 
third part addresses the on-going negotiations between the EU and China on a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The completion of the PCA will mark 
the further institutionalization of EU-China relations and serve as a “marriage 
contract” to guide the partnership’s future development.  
 
 
                                                 
1   This paper is based on the speech held by Prof. Jing Men at the inauguration of the InBev-
Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China Relations at the College of Europe in Bruges on 
29 October 2008.  
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EU-China relations have developed rapidly since the late 1990s. Despite of 
differences in ideological, cultural, political and social fields, the European Union and 
China have found common ground and common interests to develop their relation-
ship. From 1995, when the EU produced its first China policy paper, until now that the 
two sides are negotiating a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, we have 
witnessed an increasingly institutionalized partnership, facilitating cooperation on a 
wide range of issues at both multilateral and bilateral levels. As rising powers in 
international politics, the two are committed to maintaining a stable and peaceful 
international environment. The shared global responsibility and the intensified 
bilateral cooperation make them important partners. However, owing to differences 
in historical, economic and political development, the EU and China are distinct 
from each other. Differences produce attraction, but also create problems in mutual 
understanding. How to deepen bilateral cooperation and how to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century are primary concerns of those who are watching 
closely the progress in EU-China relations. 
 
A Review of EU-China Relations 
 
The European Community and China established diplomatic relations in 1975.2 
In the first two decades of bilateral relations, two important agreements were 
produced: 1978 witnessed the first bilateral trade agreement, and seven years later, 
in 1985, a new agreement was concluded on trade and economic cooperation. 
Bilateral trade grew rapidly from US$ 5.3 billion in 1981 to US$ 31.52 billion in 1994.3  
By the time the European Union completed its single market in 1992, its leader-
ship sought to further stimulate the European economy by enhancing economic 
cooperation and trade relations with the other parts of the world. Attracted by the 
dynamic economic expansion in Asia, the European Commission developed the 
paper “Towards a New Asia Strategy” in 1994.4 Located at the centre of the EU’s 
Asia strategy, China was given substantial attention. In its first separate China policy 
                                                 
2   See the chronology of EU-China relations in the Annex. 
3   See the table of EU-China trade between 1981 and 2007 in the Annex. 
4    See the official website of Directorate-General Relex of the European Commission, 
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asia/rel/index.htm. 
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paper “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations” of 1995, the European 
Commission stated:5  
The rise of China is unmatched amongst national experiences since the Second 
World War. Japan has made its mark as an economic power, the Soviet Union 
survived essentially as a military power. China is increasingly strong in both the 
military-political and the economic spheres. China is in the midst of sustained and 
dramatic economic and social change at home. Abroad, China is becoming 
part of the world security and economic system at a time of greater economic 
interdependence and when global problems, from protection of the environment 
to nuclear non-proliferation, require coordinated commitment from governments 
worldwide. 
This policy paper demonstrates that the EU had noticed China’s rise and 
considered its relations with China part of a long-term policy. China’s reform and 
“opening door” policy noticeably promoted its domestic development and external 
relations. How China would transform itself in the reform process and what kind of 
role China would play in international affairs would have a direct impact on 
international peace and cooperation. Close engagement with China became an 
important EU policy. 
From 1995 to 2003, EU-China relations embarked on a fast track, and bilateral 
relations were upgraded in many respects.6 Bilateral trade exceeded US$120 billion 
in 2003, two times more than that of 1995. In the same year, China overtook 
Switzerland to become the EU’s second largest trading partner behind the US.7 
About twenty sectoral dialogues and agreements were reached between the two 
sides, based on which a large number of cooperative programmes and projects 
were undertaken to enhance exchange and to support China’s transition towards a 
more open and plural society. The “Country Strategy Paper” and the “National 
Indicative Programmes” were developed by the EU to implement those cooperative 
programmes and projects. The first such document was out in 2002, with 250 million 
euros allocated by the European Commission to cover programmes from 2002 to 
2006.8 
                                                 
5    Communication of the Commission, “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations”, 
COM(1995) 279 final, Brussels, 5 July 1995, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/china/ 
com95_279en.pdf. 
6   Since 1995 several China policy papers were produced by the European Commission (see 
references below). In return, the Chinese government also issued one EU policy paper: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s EU Policy Paper”, Beijing, 13 October 2003, 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm.  
7    “Sino-EU Trade Relations Trending up”, China Daily, 23 October 2003, 
chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/23/content_274686.htm. 
8    See “China: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006”, ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
china/csp/index_2002.htm. 
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Together with the intensified economic and social cooperation, political 
relations were also developed rapidly during this period. Political dialogue on 
sensitive regional and international affairs was established in 1994. Since then, 
Foreign Ministers, political directors and experts from both sides are closely involved 
in a regular and constructive political dialogue. This working mechanism helps 
maintain an effective and important channel of direct communication between the 
two sides. From 1998 on, a summit meeting system was created between the EU and 
China. With all these developments, bilateral relations were noticeably institutional-
ized, widened and deepened.  
Enhanced cooperation in economic, political and other fields encouraged the 
two sides to upgrade bilateral relations. The European Commission for the first time 
used the word “partnership” in its China policy paper of 1998.9 Five years later, the 
European Commission recognised that this partnership was reaching maturity. At the 
summit meeting of that year, the two sides started to talk about promoting a 
strategic partnership by further deepening and expanding EU-China relations. 
The development of a strategic partnership brought the two into a “honey-
moon period” between 2003 and 2004. Exchanges of visits by top leaders on both 
sides became more frequent. For example, EU officials paid 206 visits to China in 
2004, on average four visits per week.10 The Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, was the 
first foreign leader to pay an official visit to the EU after its historically important 
eastward enlargement in May 2004.  
Satisfied with the progress in EU-China relations, Romano Prodi, then President of 
the European Commission, said at the EU-China business forum in May 2004 about 
the partnership between the EU and China: “if it is not a marriage, it is at least a very 
serious engagement.”11 Since then, the engagement has led to further institutionali-
zation of the partnership. The increasing interdependence between Brussels and 
Beijing develops together with their commitment to the partnership. Both need each 
other and both are willing to enter a contract which can guarantee a long-term 
stable and cooperative relationship.  
                                                 
9   Communication of the Commission, “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”, 
COM(1998) 181 final, Brussels, 25 March 1998, ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/ 
com_98/index.htm. 
10    Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, 4 July 
2005, www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_china/30th/sp05_414.htm.  
11   Romano Prodi, “Relations between the EU and China: More than Just Business”, 6 May 
2004, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp04_227.htm.  
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Up until now, the 1985 agreement is still valid as the formal basis of the 
relationship. Yet, the impressive development of bilateral relations calls for a more 
comprehensive agreement which can cover all the dimensions of cooperation. At 
the Ninth EU-China Summit in September 2006, the two sides agreed to launch talks 
on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations began in January 2007. 
Once completed, the PCA will replace the current trade-focused agreement of 1985 
and serve as a legal framework for bilateral relations.  
 
Analysis of Common Ground and Differences 
 
Strategic Vision 
An important element in the strategic partnership between the EU and China 
is their shared interests in global and regional issues. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in 
one of his speeches, defined what the Chinese expected from the relationship: 
“comprehensive” refers to “all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered 
cooperation” in various fields; “strategic” implies “long-term and stable EU-China 
relations” which transcend “the differences in ideology and social systems” and are 
“not subjected to the impact of individual events that occur from time to time;” and 
“partnership” defines cooperation “on an equal footing, mutually beneficial and 
win-win. The two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, 
endeavour to expand converging interests and seek common ground on major 
issues, while shelving differences on minor ones.”12 The definition of the partnership 
illustrates China’s pragmatic attitude in its relationship with the European Union. 
Through stable and long-lasting cooperative ties, China intends to de-emphasize 
differences in order to get the best out of the relationship. 
In its China policy paper of 2003, the European Commission pointed out that 
the EU and China share “responsibilities in promoting global governance” and that 
the EU and China should work together “to safeguard and promote sustainable 
development, peace and stability.”13 The strategic cooperation with China in 
maintaining global order was also highlighted in the European Security Strategy 
                                                 
12   “Wen Stresses Importance of Developing EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, 
People’s Daily Online, 7 May 2004, english.people.com.cn/200405/07/eng20040507_ 
142556.html. 
13   Commission policy paper, “A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in 
EU-China Relations”, COM(2003) 533 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003, europa.eu.int/comm/ 
external_relations/china/com_03_533/com_533_en.pdf. 
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which recognized that the United States is the pre-eminent world power, but “no 
single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.”14  Europe 
should be a pillar in the new world, and it should consolidate relationships with the 
other great partners, including China.  
Both the EU and China intend to play a greater role in international affairs, 
and both promote the formation of a multipolar structure that facilitates the ascend-
ance of their political influence globally. However, in policy papers or bilateral 
agreements, the EU prefers the term “multilateralism” to the term “multipolarity”. 
According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations, “It is not 
the number of poles which counts, but rather the basis on which they operate. Our 
vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral 
institutions.”15 While the Chinese still adhere to the term “multipolarity”, the 
understanding of the concept has been quietly changing from balance of power to 
democratic international decision-making. In the meantime, the usage of 
multipolarity in Chinese official documents has been steadily decreasing, whereas 
the usage of multilateralism has been steadily growing.  
Before 2003, the Chinese Foreign Ministry held that multipolarity “helps weaken 
and curb hegemonism and power politics.”16 Without mentioning the United States 
by name, China made it clear that such a policy of multipolarity was intended to 
counterbalance American power. Since August 2003, a new understanding of multi-
polarity by the Chinese government has been published on the website of Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Our efforts to promote the development of the world 
towards multipolarization are not targeted at any particular country”, but aim to 
boost the democratization of international relations.17 
In the new definition of multipolarity, China highlights the elements of multi-
lateralism such as democratization of international relations and the strengthening of 
coordination and dialogue, which to a large degree has brought it closer to the EU’s 
understanding of international relations. As 2003 was an important year in EU-China 
relations, it was quite probable that the Chinese would reach their new under-
                                                 
14    European Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy”, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, p. 1. 
15   Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, op.cit. 
16    For the Chinese government’s viewpoint on multipolarity before 2003, see 
www.chinaembassy.se/eng/zgwj/jbzc/t100415.htm. 
17    For the Chinese government’s view on multipolarity since August 2003, see 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24880.htm. 
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standing of multipolarity based on the communication with their European counter-
parts. As a result, several important speeches made by Chinese President Hu and 
Chinese Premier Wen in 2004 did not mention the term multipolarity. For example, in 
the joint declaration between China and France in January 2004, the two explicitly 
promoted multilateralism in international relations.18 
 
International Cooperation 
At the international level, there are many issues on which the EU and China 
need to cooperate to maintain international peace and security. After 9/11, the fight 
against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction became more important to both 
the EU and China. Apart from the European Security Strategy issued in December 
2003, the Council of the European Union also issued a separate paper on the “EU 
Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” to highlight the key 
challenges faced by the EU and the importance to have a multilateral response to 
these challenges in cooperation with other partners.19 In the same month in Beijing, 
China issued its first white paper on non-proliferation,20 in which China pointed out 
that the “fundamental purpose of non-proliferation is to safeguard and promote 
international and regional peace and security” and that “a universal participation of 
the international community is essential for progress in non-proliferation”.21 One year 
later in December 2004, at the Seventh EU-China Summit, the two sides issued a joint 
declaration on non-proliferation and arms control in which they pledged to “work 
together within their strategic partnership” and “to strengthen the international non-
proliferation system.”22 The close coordination between the EU and China in their 
positions on non-proliferation indicated that both regard each other as an important 
partner in international cooperation for peace and security. It also pointed to a 
shared understanding between the two sides on these issues of mutual concern.  
It is noticeable that in developing its strategic partnership with the EU, China 
has taken greater steps in adapting and adjusting itself according to the principles 
                                                 
18   Thomas G. Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalisation”, in Yong Deng 
and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), China Rising, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 135.  
19   See the “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 
www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc_118532.en03.pdf. 
20   Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, “China’s Non-proliferation Policy and 
Measures”, December 2003, www.china.org.cn/e-white/20031202/index.htm. 
21   Ibid.  
22   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China 
and the European Union on Non-proliferation and Arms Control”, 9 December 2009, 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t173749.htm. 
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and norms widely accepted in the international society. Coming from a background 
of a victim of colonialism, imperialism and feudalism and with a relatively short history 
of modern state-building, China took pains to change itself to integrate into interna-
tional regimes. Albeit a latecomer, China has become a member of all the 
important intergovernmental organizations. On the other hand, the integration 
process has not been without problem. Due to differences in ideology, political 
understanding on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and 
considerations of national interest, China is perceived as an uneasy partner in 
multilateral cooperation.  
The Darfur issue has long been a problematic issue in China’s external 
relations. China is believed to maintain a good relationship with the Sudanese 
government in return for petrol to feed the rapidly developing Chinese industries. 
China’s support to Khartoum indirectly prolonged the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. 
Between 1999 and 2006 Sudan’s oil exports to China increased from 266,126 tons to 
more than 6.5 million tons. In 2005 and 2006, China imported 47 percent of Sudan’s 
total oil production.23 Since the Darfur fighting started in 2003, China has been under 
international pressure to take actions to help relieve the humanitarian disaster in 
Darfur. By mid-2006, China started to lobby the Sudanese government to allow a 
foreign intervention in Darfur.24 In June 2007, Liu Guijin, the Chinese special envoy on 
the Darfur issue helped convince the Sudanese government to let a hybrid force of 
UN and African Union peacekeepers deploy in Darfur.25 Two groups of Chinese 
peacekeeping soldiers arrived in Darfur in November 2007 and July 2008 respectively, 
serving as part of the 26,000-strong peacekeeping force in the region.26 In the UN 
Security Council, China abstained on most of the resolutions on the Darfur issue. On 
the one hand, China insisted that national sovereignty should be respected; on the 
other hand, it was unwilling to block the resolutions which would be in direct conflict 
with its efforts to build a responsible image in the world. The call for boycotting the 
Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 by some political leaders and NGOs, partly due to 
China’s lack of action on the Darfur issue, reminded the Chinese government of its 
responsibility as a rising power. Both out of its own desire to integrate in international 
                                                 
23   Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Victory in Sudan’s Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 2 August 
2007, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article23090. 
24   Ibid. 
25   “China Considers Sending Peacekeepers to Darfur”, International Herald Tribune, 22 June 
2007, www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/22/news/darfur.php. 
26   “Chinese Peacekeepers in Darfur Honored by UNAMID”, China Daily, 13 October 2008, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-10/13/content_7097821.htm. 
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regimes and out of the international pressure, the Chinese leadership gradually gives 
more emphasis to its international responsibility. As a matter of fact, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao has in 2008 on many occasions stated that after thirty years of 
reform, the relationship between China and the world has changed profoundly. 
China has become an important member of the international society, and China is 
willing to fulfil its international responsibilities.27 The EU with its rich experience of 
multilateral cooperation could be helpful to China’s further international engage-
ment. 
Thanks to the dynamic growth of its foreign trade, China has become the 
country with the largest foreign currency reserve. By the end of September 2008, 
China had a foreign currency reserve of more than US$1.91 trillion. By the first quarter 
o f  2 0 0 9,  it is  e x p e c te d  to  a m o u n t to  U S$2 trillion. Among the reserve, China held 
US$1.05 trillion US bonds and debt.28  
For three decades, the Chinese economic growth compounded at an annual 
average rate of 10 percent. It became a member of the World Trade Organization in 
2001 after fifteen years of negotiation. It is the second largest trading partner of both 
the United States and the European Union. But the most recent statistics showed that 
the third quarter growth of 2008 fell to 9 percent, the slowest pace in five years and 
well below forecasts. There have been signs that the Chinese economy might slow 
down more sharply than expected due partly to the problems in international credit 
markets.29  
At present, sustainable global economic development is facing a serious 
challenge due to the financial crisis in many countries in the world. Starting from Wall 
Street in the United States, the financial problems have rapidly expanded to 
European countries. In early October 2008, in a rare coordinated move, the Federal 
Reserve of the United States, the central banks of Europe and China jointly cut 
interest rates.30 After the US government decided to allocate 700 billion dollars to 
shore up Wall Street, the current president of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
held a G-4 conference in Paris, chaired the European Council meeting in Brussels 
                                                 
27    See, for example, Hu Jintao, “Reform and Opening Has Led to Profound Changes in 
China”, 12 April 2008, www.china.com.cn/news/2008-04/12/content_14941423.htm. 
28   Zhang Ming, “How to Pass the Subprime Crisis Safely with US$2 Trillion”, Chinese Financial 
Times, 17 October 2008, www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001022533& page=1. 
29   Geoff Dyer, “China to Provide Stimulus Package”, Chinese Financial Times, 21 October 
2008, www.ftchinese.com/story.php?lang=en&storyid=001022604. 
30   “Fed Leads Round of Global Interest Rate Cuts”, MSNBC News, 8 October 2008, 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27080774. 
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and met President Bush at Camp David to call for an international summit to reform 
the global financial system. In Sarkozy's view, both the industrialized nations and the 
large developing nations should be invited, and China as a rising power should 
participate in the summit.31 The request from the EU on international financial coope-
ration indicates the high degree of economic interdependence between the states 
and that only by enhanced international cooperation between the EU, China and 
other countries will the problems be tackled. At the ASEM meeting in Beijing in 
October 2008, Chinese Premier Wen declared that China would actively attend the 
G-20 summit meeting scheduled for the mid of November 2008 and emphasized that 
“confidence, cooperation and responsibility are the keys to finding a solution to the 
global financial meltdown.”32 
 
Bilateral Issues: Trade Relations 
Between the EU and China, intensified economic and trade relations are the 
founding stone of the maturing partnership. By far, the EU is China’s largest trading 
partner and its most important supplier of technology. China is the EU’s second 
largest trading partner, the biggest source of manufactured imports and the fastest 
growing export market. Together with the impressive growth of the two-way trade, 
the trade deficit for the EU has also been rising rapidly. While China’s exports to the 
EU grew from US$19.83 billion in 1996 to US$245.19 billion in 2007, China’s imports from 
the EU only increased from US$19.89 billion in 1996 to US$110.96 billion in 2007. In the 
past ten years the EU’s deficit jumped to US$ 134.23 billion.33 The EU is increasingly 
complaining about the rising deficit in its trade with China. In its most recent China 
policy paper, the EU regards China as “the single most important challenge for EU 
trade policy.”34 Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson warned that “We have to 
make sure that the public is satisfied that that trading relationship is being conducted 
                                                 
31  “Rencontre Bush-Sarkozy-Barroso à Camp David pour parler de la crise financière”, 
Euronews, 10 October 2008, www.euronews.net/fr/article/18/10/2008/sarkozy-seeks-us-
backing-for-global-money-summit. 
32   Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese Premier: Co-op Needed to Deal with Global Economic 
Problems”, 25 October 2008, news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/25/content_10251510.htm. 
33    See Luo Xiumei and Zhang Jing, “A Look at the China-EU Trade in 2004” [2004nian 
Zhongguo yu Oumeng maoyi huigu], (2005) 2, European Integration Studies [Ouzhou yitihua 
yanjiu], p. 33; “China-EU Trade Hits US$272.3 billion in 2006”, China Daily, 28 January 2006; and 
“Facts and Figures about China-EU Trade”, People’s Daily Online, 28 April 2008, 
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/6400153.html. 
34    Commission Working Document accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, 
Growing Responsibilities, “A Policy Paper on EU-China Trade and Investment: Competition 
and Partnership”, COM(2006) 632 final, Brussels, 24 October 2006, trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130791.pdf, p. 3. 
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on full and fair trade, otherwise we are going to be in trouble.”35 According to the 
EU, the imbalance has been partly caused by obstacles to market access in China. 
The EU urges China to liberalize trade flows by removing barriers to imports, including 
price controls, and discriminatory registration requirements.36  
One of the motivations for the EU to support China’s access to the World 
Trade Organization was to stimulate the opening of the Chinese market. China’s 
WTO membership did oblige China to remove trade barriers and reduce 
dramatically import tax, however, many kinds of non-trade barriers still exist, which to 
a large degree prevent EU products and investments from entering the Chinese 
market. In recent years, the two sides have widely expanded and strengthened their 
trade and economic dialogue at all levels covering trade policy, textile trade, 
competition policy, customs cooperation, intellectual property rights, regulatory and 
industrial policy. In order to address the imbalance in trade flows between the EU 
and China, the Chinese government proposed to establish the High-Level Economic 
and Trade Dialogue. This proposal was agreed at the summit meeting of November 
2007. The first such high-level dialogue was held in Beijing in late April 2008. 
Dialogue with China has been an important part of the EU’s China policy. 
Under the strategic guidance of constructive engagement with China in the 1990s, 
the EU initiated several dialogues with China on economic, political and human 
rights issues. Despite the growing complaints from some of the member states about 
the cheap Chinese products and China’s slow pace of market opening, the EU 
adheres to its dialogue principle. This cooperation-oriented approach has largely 
helped enhance bilateral communication and understanding. Thanks to the 
intensive dialogue between the two sides, the textile dispute in 2005 could be solved 
rather rapidly. Agreed by both sides, from the beginning of 2008, the temporarily 
introduced import restrictions by the EU on Chinese products have been replaced by 
a joint monitoring system. China works closely with the European Commission in 
export license and product surveillance in order to avoid a repetition of the 2005 
situation. Today, it seems that through joint efforts this new system works well. 
 
                                                 
35     “Mandelson Warning on China Trade”, BBC News,  news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 
7048488.stm, 17 October 2007. 
36   See EU-China Trade Relations, www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_china_wto/EU%20China%20 
Trade%20Relations.htm. 
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Bilateral Issues: Arms Embargo 
A difficult issue is the arms embargo imposed in 1989 by the Western countries 
against China. The lifting of the arms embargo has been a topic of discussion in the 
EU since 2003. As the arms embargo is the lingering legacy of the Tiananmen event 
in 1989, its removal would indicate the EU’s recognition of China’s progress in the 
past years as well as its growing role in global affairs. The EU, led by France and 
Germany, agreed that a new code of conduct37 regulating deliveries of European 
weapons to China should be prepared to replace the arms embargo. The 
discussions between the leading member states of the EU and China in 2004 seemed 
to promise a lifting of the ban. Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, told the French radio Europe 1 in an interview that the 
embargo might be removed in the first six months of 2005.38 
However, in early 2005 the issue became more complex owing to US 
concerns. Washington urged the EU to maintain the embargo and threatened to cut 
off American transfers of military technology to Europe. US Deputy Secretary of State, 
Robert Zoellick, warned EU officials that if ever “European equipment helped kill 
American men and women in conflict, that would not be good for the (transatlantic) 
relationship.”39  
After China passed the anti-secession law40 in March 2005, the lifting of the 
embargo became even more difficult for the EU. The EU does not want to see an 
increase in cross-Strait instability and the risk of an arms race. The US Secretary of 
State, Condoleezza Rice, warned that the EU should not upset the balance of power 
in a region in which it has no defence responsibilities.41 Facing pressure from the 
United States, Javier Solana said that the EU had not changed its position on lifting 
the arms embargo against China and that it was “too early to say” whether it could 
be done under the Luxembourg Presidency.42 Inside the EU, opposition to lifting the 
                                                 
37   Inside the EU, the Code of Conduct sets the rules and conditions that all the EU member 
states should follow and based on which they may sell their weapons to other countries. 
38   “Solana: EU May Lift Arms Ban on China Early Next Year”, Europe 1, 9 December 2004, 
www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t173855.htm. 
39   Sebastian Alison, “US Warns EU over Lifting China Arms Ban”, Reuters, 5 April 2005. 
40   The anti-secession law was approved by the Chinese National People’s Congress with the 
purpose of emphasizing its sovereignty over Taiwan and of keeping Taiwan from declaring 
independence. 
41   Jonathan Watts and Nicholas Watt, “Rice Tells EU: Don't Lift China Arms Ban”, The 
Guardian, 21 March 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mar/21/china.usa. 
42   “EU's Position on Lifting China Arms Ban Remains Unchanged”, People’s Daily Online, 24 
March 2005, english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/24/eng20050324_177991.html. 
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ban grew. In April 2005, the European Parliament voted 431 to 85, with 31 absten-
tions, in favour of a resolution urging the EU to keep the arms embargo.43 Linking the 
lifting of the arms embargo and China’s human rights record, Annalisa Giannella, 
Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Javier Solana, stated in April 2005, 
“Nobody has said we are going to lift our embargo for free. It would require an 
important concrete step to be taken by the Chinese.”44 The British Ambassador to 
China, Christopher Hum, said that “China must set a timetable for ratifying the 
international covenant on human rights before the EU will lift the ban.” The German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, insisted that the embargo should remain in place until 
China improves its human rights record.45  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the two most important legal 
documents of the UN on human rights. Most of the countries in the world are 
signatories of these two covenants. Before applying for hosting the 29th Olympic 
Games, China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998. 
Before the IOC made the final decision of the host city in July 2001, China ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in March 2001. Now 
that ten years have passed after China signed the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the EU expects China to ratify it as soon as possible. Without 
seeing progress in human rights in China, the EU would not consider the lifting of the 
arms embargo. For Beijing, the ratification of the covenant is an important 
bargaining chip in hand. When the time comes, the National People’s Congress will 
ratify this document. But inside the EU, 27 member states may not easily achieve a 
unanimous position. If one single member state is against the lifting of the arms 
embargo, the efforts for China to ratify the covenant will not get in return what China 
expects. Therefore, this seemingly military and political issue is closely bound with the 
human rights issue. When it will be lifted is not clear. However, since the embargo has 
been there for nearly two decades and EU-China relations have been developing 
rapidly without being affected, the two sides will probably not allow it to bother the 
further development of their bilateral partnership.  
                                                 
43   Richard Bernstein, “Backpedaling on the Arms Ban”, International Herald Tribune, 15 April 
2005, www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/14/news/embargo.php. 
44    Quoted in Katrin Bennhold and Graham Bowley, “EU Weighs Tying Arms Embargo to 
Rights”, International Herald Tribune, 13 April 2005. 
45   “In Europe, Hu Faces Trade and Human Rights Issues”, The New York Times, 9 November 
2005. 
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Problems and Promises in Bilateral Relations 
As already mentioned, a major difference between the EU and China is that 
they come from different ideological backgrounds and different political systems. 
This difference is compounded by the fact that the EU and China are at different 
stages of development. The EU focuses on political freedom and attaches great 
importance to the political and civil rights of its citizens. In contrast, China 
concentrates on solving economic problems so that all the Chinese can have 
enough to eat and wear. China was lagging much behind the industrialized 
countries when the PRC was founded in 1949. The economic reform carried out since 
the end of the 1970s has brought dynamism to the Chinese economy. Some Chinese 
benefited from government policy and became rich. But the uneven development 
in China has led to a huge gap between the big cities such as Beijing or Shanghai 
and most of the vast land of the Chinese interior. China’s GDP per capita in 2006 was 
around US$ 2,100, whereas the GDP per capita of the fifteen members of the 
European Monetary Union had already reached more than US$34,000 in the same 
year.46 As a result, China stresses more the economic rights of its citizens. This fails to 
correspond to the EU’s expectations. The EU wants to exert influence on China and 
to turn it into a liberal democratic regime based on the rule of law. Since the 1990s, 
the EU has been keeping a close eye on the development of political rights of the 
Chinese citizens. In order to promote an open society, the EU has financed many 
programmes and projects in China, including a training program of Chinese lawyers. 
The human rights dialogue between the EU and China was started in 1995. After 
a period of interruption, the dialogue was resumed in 1997. The two sides meet twice 
annually in order to discuss human rights issues. One of the goals in the EU’s human 
rights dialogue with China is to urge Beijing to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The European Parliament is active in monitoring China’s 
human rights behaviour. From 2005 on, it has passed more than a dozen resolutions 
expressing concern over the issue. The EU has consistently stated in all of its China 
policy papers that democracy, human rights and the promotion of common values 
remain fundamental tenets of EU policy and of central importance to its relations 
with China.47 Yet, contact with China seems to tell the Europeans that it is not that 
                                                 
46   “Global Income per capita”, www.finfacts.com/biz10/globalworldincome percapita.htm. 
47   Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “EU-
China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities”, COM(2006) 631 final, Brussels, 24 October 
2006, ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf, p. 4. 
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easy to transform this huge authoritarian system. In recent years, criticism on China’s 
slow pace of political reform, on its human rights record, on its lack of transparency in 
military expenditure, and on its restriction on market access dominates the media in 
Europe.  
What makes bilateral cooperation more complicated is that unlike China, the 
EU is composed of 27 member states. As a regional organization, the EU has many 
features that are different from a sovereign state. For economic and trade issues, the 
European Commission plays a leading role by working together with the European 
Parliament and the Council, where decisions are made by a qualified majority of 
member states. In negotiations of economic and trade issues, China knows to whom 
it talks to and with whom it needs to work out an agreement. But for political and 
military issues, the situation is more problematic. The arms embargo issue falls into the 
domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy that requires unanimity of all the 
member states of the EU. Each individual member state, no matter big or small, is 
important in the decisions taken by the Council of the European Union. Member 
states may have different national interests and different political positions 
concerning their China policy. When the embargo was introduced in 1989, the 
Community had only twelve members. Now with twenty-seven members, it is more 
difficult to achieve consensus on scrapping the ban on arm sales. 
In order to promote EU-China cooperation, China needs to work with both the 
European institutions and the member states. However, the central concerns and 
interests of these institutions are also different. The officials of the Commission are 
more concerned with tangible results in economic cooperation and pay less atten-
tion to the differences of norms and values between them and their partners, 
whereas the European Parliament counts on the public opinion and is concerned 
about normative differences with its external partners. As the European Parliament is 
influential in the making of major international agreements, China is obliged to 
establish a reasonable working relationship with it. 
Another factor which has a strong impact on EU-China relations is the United 
States. Different from EU-China relations, EU-US relations are based on common 
values, a common cultural and historical background, similar political systems and a 
long tradition of alliance. In comparison to the relatively recent EU-China partnership, 
the transatlantic partnership is much deeper and more stable. On the other hand, for 
several decades in China’s external relations, the United States has been the first 
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priority. How to maintain a workable relationship with the US in order to maintain a 
favourable international environment has always been the most important concern 
for the Chinese government. Therefore, how the EU and China deepen their partner-
ship and in the meantime keep their commitment to their respective relations with 
the US is not an easy task. 
While admitting that there exist many differences, the Chinese government 
points out that there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the 
EU. Neither side poses a threat to the other. In its EU policy paper, Beijing states that 
“given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system 
and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views 
or even disagree on some issues.” But “the common ground between China and the 
EU far outweighs their disagreements”: 
Both China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations and an 
enhanced role of the UN. Both are committed to combating international 
terrorism and promoting sustainable development through poverty elimination 
and environmental protection endeavours. China and the EU are highly 
complementary economically thanks to their respective advantages. Both China 
and the EU member states have a long history and splendid culture each and 
stand for more cultural exchanges and mutual emulation.48  
The common ground between the EU and China, the institutionalized coopera-
tion mechanisms, and the commitment of the leadership to engaging with each 
other and to working together to promote international peace and security serve as 
an important basis of bilateral cooperation. 
 
Prospects for the PCA 
 
In September 2006 at the Ninth EU-China Summit, the two sides agreed to start 
negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In the EU's view, the PCA 
should cover all the dimensions of bilateral relations. It expects that the new treaty 
will be an upgrade of the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, and 
that a wide range of issues will be covered in the document to define EU-China 
relations in the 21st century. But the Chinese Ministry of Commerce wishes to separate 
the negotiation of a new trade and economic cooperation agreement from that of 
the PCA. In other words, two documents are to be produced by the ongoing 
negotiations: one on the economic relations between the EU and China, the other 
                                                 
48   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s EU Policy Paper”, 13 October 2003, 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm. 
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on the strategic partnership. The negotiations involve two distinct groups of officials 
and experts: Directorate-General Trade works closely with the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce to negotiate economic issues, whereas Directorate-General Relex works 
with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on political issues. 
No matter whether the negotiations will result in one or two documents, it is 
clear that both the EU and China are serious about their relationship and are willing 
to commit themselves to consolidating what has been achieved and to cooperating 
on what can be jointly developed. In that sense, we may say that the further institu-
tionalization of the partnership serves as a “marriage contract” between the two. 
With cautious optimism, we may see a more intensified and comprehensive partner-
ship between the EU and China in the coming decade. 
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Annex 
 
EU-China Trade 1981-2007 (in bn US$) 
 
Year  Volume of trade  Chinese imports from EU  Chinese exports to EU 
1981  5.3 2.77  2.53 
1982  4.42 2.22  2.2 
1983  5.93 3.41 2.52 
1984  5.88 3.53 2.35 
1985  8.36 6.11 2.25 
1986  11.65 7.66  3.99 
1987  11.15 7.26  3.89 
1988  12.87 8.15  4.72 
1989  23.51 14.75  8.76 
1990  22.21 12.81  9.32 
1991  11.61 6.24  5.37 
1992  17.4 9.8  7.6 
1993  26.1 14.41  11.69 
1994  31.52 16.94 14.58 
1995  40.34 21.25 19.09 
1996  39.69 19.89 19.83 
1997  43 19.19  23.81 
1998  48.86 20.71 28.15 
1999  55.68 25.47 30.21 
2000  69.04 30.85 38.19 
2001  76.63 35.72 40.91 
2002  86.75 38.54 48.21 
2003  125.22 53.06  72.15 
2004  177.29 70.12 107.16 
2005  217.31 73.60 143.71 
2006  272.30 90.32 181.98 
2007  356.15 110.96 245.19 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
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EU-China Relations: Chronology 
 
May 1975  Diplomatic relations established 
February 1978  Trade agreement signed 
May 1985  Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation signed 
October 1988  Opening of the Delegation of the European Commission in Beijing 
July 1995  First Commission Communication “A long-term Policy for China-
Europe Relations” 
March 1998  Commission Communication “Building a Comprehensive Partnership 
with China” 
April 1998  1st EU-China Summit, London 
December 1999  2nd EU-China Summit, Beijing 
October 2000  3rd EU-China Summit, Beijing 
September 2001  4th EU-China Summit, Brussels 
September 2002  5th EU-China Summit, Copenhagen 
September 2003  European Commission adopts policy paper “A maturing partnership: 
shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations” 
October 2003  China releases first ever policy paper on the EU 
October 2003  6th EU-China Summit, Beijing 
December 2004   7th EU-China Summit, The Hague 
September 2005   8th EU-China Summit, Beijing 
September 2006  9th EU-China Summit, Helsinki 
October 2006  Commission Communication “EU-China Close Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities” and a policy paper on trade and investment 
November 2007  10th EU-China Summit, Beijing 




10th EU-China Summit, Lyon  
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